EVM stands for Electronic Voting Machine — a device used to electronically record and count votes. The Indian EVM system is termed ECI-EVM, specifically designed and manufactured for elections as per ECI rules.

ECI-EVM consists of a Ballot Unit (BU), Control Unit (CU), and Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT). It falls under the category of DRE (Direct Recording Electronic) voting machines, considered more efficient than paper ballots as they eliminate invalid votes, reduce counting time, and ensure a vote is registered for a single candidate only.

In paper ballot voting, voters mark a ballot paper, fold it, and deposit it in a ballot box. Issues include invalid votes from improper marking, susceptibility to booth capturing, and slow manual counting prone to errors.

In EVM voting, the Presiding Officer releases the electronic ballot by pressing the “Ballot Button” on the Control Unit. The voter presses the blue button against their chosen candidate. A red LED glows, and VVPAT prints a slip showing the candidate’s name and symbol, visible for ~7 seconds. A beep confirms the vote. No technical knowledge is required — it is as simple as pressing a button.

Key advantages: no invalid votes, booth capturing is eliminated (max 4 votes/minute), quick and error-free counting, and instant vote verification via VVPAT slip.

Electronic Voting Machines (BU & CU) were used for the first time in the by-elections to the Parur Assembly Constituency of Kerala in 1982.

Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) with EVM was used for the first time in the by-election to Noksen Assembly Constituency of Nagaland in 2013.

The legal framework for VVPAT was introduced on 14th August 2013.

Presently, the M3 Model of ECI-EVM and VVPAT are used. Like earlier models, M3 EVMs/VVPATs are non-networked, stand-alone units that run on their own batteries/power-packs.

Post Lok Sabha 2019, ECI uses only M3 Model EVMs and VVPATs. A total of 17.40 lakh VVPAT units were deployed in all polling stations across the country in 2019.

Procurement cost of M3 machines: 2013–14: ₹645.75 Cr | 2017–19: ₹4,876.71 Cr | 2021–23: ₹3,960.10 Cr | Total: ₹9,482.56 Cr.

EVMs/VVPATs are NOT imported. They are indigenously designed and manufactured by two Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs): Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), under the Ministry of Defence, and Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL), under the Department of Atomic Energy — both under the guidance of ECI’s Technical Expert Committee (TEC).

Current costs: BU — ₹7,991 | CU — ₹9,812 | VVPAT — ₹16,132. The economic life of EVMs is approximately 15 years.

The ECI-EVM system can record a maximum of 2,000 votes, but is generally used for recording up to 1,500 votes only.

Each Ballot Unit can cater to 16 candidates including NOTA. Up to 24 BUs can be connected to a CU, allowing one set of EVM to cater to a maximum of 384 candidates including NOTA.

EVM and VVPAT do not require any external power supply. EVM runs on a 7.5 Volt power pack and VVPAT runs on a 22.5 Volt power pack, both supplied by BEL/ECIL. No external electricity connection is needed.

Yes. During simultaneous elections, two separate sets of EVMs are required at each polling station — one for the Parliamentary Constituency and one for the Legislative Assembly Constituency.

When the voter presses a candidate button on the BU, an LED glows red against that candidate. The VVPAT prints a slip showing the serial number, name, and symbol of the chosen candidate, visible for ~7 seconds. A loud beep from the CU confirms the vote is registered. Both audio and visual confirmation is provided.

EVMs are electronic machines and like any machine can fail. Failed machines are sent to factories for rectification. However, malfunctioning in a way that favours a particular candidate (tampering) is simply not possible given the many technical safeguards incorporated in the EVM design.

Yes. The Election Commission has full control over the entire voting process. All election officials work directly under the direction, supervision, and control of ECI during the election period.

CU power pack rating: 7.5 Volts, 2AH. VVPAT power pack rating: 22.5 Volts, 4AH. BU uses the same power pack as the CU when more than four BUs are used.

The Control Unit displays the remaining power status as “High”, “Medium”, “Low”, “Marginal”, and “Change Battery” along with a percentage indicator. When “Change Battery” is displayed, the power pack is replaced from reserve power packs available with Sector Officers.

VVPAT printed slips are approximately 99mm × 56mm in size. They are thermal paper with a print retention capability of about five years when stored properly.

Each VVPAT printed slip contains: Candidate Serial Number, Name of the Candidate, Symbol of the party or Candidate, Session Number, and VVPAT ID. All these details are visible to the voter.

Yes. Each VVPAT slip contains the unique ID number of the VVPAT that printed it. This allows identification of the source VVPAT machine from any printed slip.

FLC is conducted by authorised engineers of BEL and ECIL at district headquarters, under the supervision of the District Election Officer, and in the presence of representatives of National and State recognised political parties.

ECI provides EVMs on loan basis only to State Election Commissions (SECs) for local body elections, subject to: (i) the relevant law permitting use of EVMs; (ii) only discontinued models within 15-year economic life are loaned; (iii) subject to availability.

No. Commissioning of EVMs is done by election officials deputed by the District Election Officer/Returning Officer in the presence of contesting candidates or their authorised representatives. BEL/ECIL engineers (generally 2 per Assembly Constituency) only assist in symbol loading in VVPATs.

After 15 years, EVMs/VVPATs are sent back to BEL/ECIL for destruction following a standard protocol: PCBs are separated and all components removed/crushed; bare PCBs are cut into minimum 4 pieces and crushed; plastic housings are cut and crushed; plastic waste is recycled; the entire process is videographed; e-waste is channelized to registered dismantlers; and a proper record of each unit destroyed is maintained.

No — it is actually easier. EVMs are lighter, portable, and come with custom-made carrying cases. They are transported under strict security with elaborate safeguards.

Stakeholders participate at every stage: opening/closing of EVM warehouses (under videography), First Level Checking, training EVMs, First and Second Randomisation, Commissioning, dispersal of EVMs, Mock Poll on poll day, transport from polling stations to collection centres, storage in strong rooms (candidates may put their own seals), and on counting day including VVPAT verification. Lists of EVMs are shared at each stage.

EVMs are always in secure EVM warehouses/strong rooms under the custody of the District Election Officer with: 24×7 CCTV coverage, double lock system, armed security (half section non-election period, full section during elections), and one Platoon of CAPF at inner cordon for polled EVMs.

After result declaration, BU, CU, and VVPAT slips are kept in the strong room for 45 days (or until final disposal of any Election Petition). VVPAT slips are kept as per Rule 94 of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961.

Yes. EVM warehouses/strong rooms are always opened and closed only after prior intimation and in the presence of stakeholders (representatives of recognised political parties/candidates), and under videography.

After poll, EVMs are stored in a strong room with a single access door and two-layered security. Candidate agents may watch EVMs round the clock. Strong room locks are sealed with signatures of officials and candidates. Lists of EVM serial numbers and vote counts are shared with candidates. VVPAT power source is removed at the polling station in front of polling agents. Live CCTV feed of the strong room entry is provided to candidate representatives. Hence, all stakeholders jointly guard polled EVMs with no implicit trust requirement.

Yes. FLC is conducted in the presence of representatives of recognised political parties. The DEO gives a written invitation to political parties at district headquarters, with a copy endorsed to their state headquarters, at least two days before FLC begins.

FLC-rejected units are sent to BEL/ECIL for rectification. Upon rectification, they become available for subsequent elections. Rejected units are also analysed by manufacturers and the Technical Expert Committee for future improvements to reduce field rejections.

VVPAT slips generated during FLC are disposed of daily through a paper shredding machine to prevent misuse for generating fake stories or misinformation. Note: FLC VVPAT slips have only dummy symbols, not actual candidate symbols.

Yes. After FLC, the list of FLC-accepted EVMs and VVPATs (containing unique ID of each unit) is provided to all recognised political parties and, once candidates are finalised, to candidates as well.

No. Electrical repair is strictly prohibited in the field. Only mechanical repair (changing buttons, flaps, latches, etc.) is allowed during FLC, with no electrical work involved. Representatives of recognised political parties witness the entire process.

FLC-OK units are stored in the Strong Room under double lock in the presence of recognised political party representatives. The strong room has 24×7 CCTV coverage and one section of armed security. It is opened only in the presence of political party/candidate representatives under videography.

If a BU or CU goes out of order (fault displayed on CU), the full set (BU, CU, VVPAT) is replaced from Reserve EVMs in the presence of polling agents. Votes recorded up to that point remain safe in the CU memory and VVPAT drop box. If only the VVPAT fails, polling resumes after replacing only the VVPAT. On counting day, votes from all EVMs used at that polling station are counted. If CU data cannot be ascertained, VVPAT slips of those CUs are counted instead.

The CU stores results until the data is deliberately deleted. Post-election, ECI retains EVMs until the Election Petition period (45 days) expires. If petitions are filed, EVMs are retained until final disposal. If a court orders a recount, the CU can be reactivated by fitting the battery. VVPAT slips are also preserved until final disposal of any Election Petition.

No votes are wasted. Unused BU buttons are physically “masked” (covered) by the Returning Officer during EVM preparation. For example, if there are only 10 candidates, buttons 11–16 are masked and cannot be pressed by any voter.

No. Changing the thermal paper roll is strictly prohibited at polling stations. If the roll gets exhausted, a reserve VVPAT is used as replacement.

On Poll Day before commencement, the Presiding Officer presses the result button — the CU display shows zero votes for all candidates. The PO opens the VVPAT ballot compartment to show it is empty. A Mock Poll of at least 50 votes is then conducted in front of polling agents, and the electronic result is tallied with VVPAT slip count. After mock poll, the “Clear Button” is pressed, the result is cleared, and the CU again shows ‘0’ votes before sealing, in front of polling agents.

In addition to the ‘Result’ button, there is a ‘Total’ button on the CU. Pressing it at any time displays the total votes polled so far without revealing candidate-wise results. At end of poll, the ‘Close’ button is pressed (no more votes accepted), and the total is recorded by the PO in Form 17-C, a copy of which is given to polling agents.

A device called ‘Totaliser’ was prototyped that can accommodate up to 14 CUs simultaneously and aggregate votes without revealing individual polling station-wise counts. However, Totalisers are not currently in use as technical aspects and statutory/administrative related issues remain under examination, and the matter is sub-judice.

Compulsory VVPAT slip counting is done in two cases: (i) If a CU shows “no display” of result, the VVPAT slips of that machine are counted; (ii) As directed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, mandatory verification of VVPAT slips of five randomly selected polling stations per Assembly Constituency/Segment before declaring results.

During Commissioning, a Ballot sheet is prepared on a laptop/PC provided by the DEO, using candidate details. This sheet is loaded into VVPAT units using a Symbol Loading Unit (SLU). The process is done by authorised BEL/ECIL engineers in the presence of candidates/their agents. Symbols being loaded are simultaneously displayed on a large monitor/TV for all to view.

Symbols are loaded in presence of contesting candidates using a Windows OS-based Symbol Loading Application (SLA) developed by BEL/ECIL. The SLA is installed on a DEO/RO-provided PC/Laptop. A ‘VVPAT sheet’ is created as a graphic image (.bmp format) with candidate details, then uploaded to the SLU via USB cable. The SLU then loads the data into the VVPAT.

The graphical data loaded onto VVPAT through SLU is 4 KB with a graphical resolution of 192×168 pixels. This data contains the serial numbers, names, and symbols of all contesting candidates including NOTA.

Confirmation is done through multiple steps: (i) Live viewing of symbol loading on a TV/monitor during the process; (ii) A long test printout of all candidates’ serial numbers, names, and symbols is printed and certified by RO/ARO; (iii) One vote is cast for each contesting candidate including NOTA and verified with VVPAT slips; (iv) 1,000 votes are cast in randomly selected 5% of EVMs and CU results are tallied with VVPAT slip count; (v) Mock poll on poll day allows polling agents to verify symbols again.

VVPAT slips generated during commissioning are destroyed daily through paper shredding to prevent misuse. Note: unlike FLC slips (which have dummy symbols), commissioning slips have actual candidate symbols, making their disposal especially important.

Yes. During preparation of VVPAT, the RO/ARO mandatorily takes a test printout of all candidate serial numbers, names, and symbols for cross-checking with the ballot paper in BU. Thereafter, one vote for each candidate including NOTA is cast to verify the VVPAT is printing correctly.

After the last voter votes, the PO presses the ‘Close’ button — the EVM accepts no more votes. Poll start and end times are recorded in the machine and by the PO. The CU is then switched off, BU is disconnected and kept separately in sealed carrying cases. Each polling agent receives a copy of Form 17-C (total votes recorded). On counting day, CU vote counts are tallied against Form 17-C, and any discrepancy can be flagged by counting agents.

Yes. Counting is done in the presence of all contesting candidates and their counting agents. The Counting Official simply presses the “RESULT” button on the CU — candidate-wise results appear automatically. No special knowledge is needed. Lists of EVMs deployed at all polling stations are shared in advance. VVPAT slips of five randomly selected polling stations per AC/AS are also tallied with CU counts. Till date, slips of 41,629 randomly selected VVPATs have been tallied — not a single case of vote transfer from candidate A to candidate B has been found.

The EVM system is as simple as a basic calculator. Ordinary citizens verify their vote through the VVPAT slip at the time of voting. Subsequently, VVPAT slips of five randomly selected polling stations per AC/AS are tallied with CU electronic counts. For parliamentary elections, this means verifying 20,625 randomly chosen VVPATs — sufficient to establish election integrity with near certainty.

The VVPAT enables voters to immediately verify their vote by observing the printed ballot slip showing name, serial number, and symbol of the chosen candidate. The correlation between VVPAT slip count and CU electronic count is established statistically with a very high degree of confidence, as mandated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Till date, 41,629 randomly selected VVPATs have been tallied with zero cases of vote transfer from one candidate to another.

VVPAT slip counting is done per well-established procedure as directed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court — not in an ad-hoc manner. Additionally, candidates may request VVPAT slip count under Rule 56D of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961. An Election Petition may also be filed after result declaration, wherein every VVPAT slip may be counted as per court direction.

If CU power pack drains on voting day, the Presiding Officer replaces it with a reserve power pack in presence of polling agents and Sector Officer, and re-seals the CU section with polling agents’ signatures. Similarly for VVPAT power pack. However, such need arises rarely.

Yes. An awareness campaign is conducted approximately 3 months before election announcement through physical demonstrations at District Election Offices and sub-division offices. A Mobile Demonstration Van covers every Assembly Constituency. After election announcement, only digital outreach is conducted — physical demonstrations stop to avoid any fake narratives.

Yes. After second randomisation through the EVM Management System (EMS), EVMs are allocated polling station-wise. The list of randomised EVMs including reserve EVMs is generated and candidates’ signatures are obtained. A copy of this list is provided to each candidate.

This instruction prevents printing of VVPAT slips with actual candidate symbols on dispersal day, which could be misused to generate fake stories, disinformation, or rumours about the election. It is a precautionary measure against misinformation.

This claim is false and baseless. Replacement is impossible because: EVM lists are shared with political parties and candidates in advance; candidate representatives sign the seals during commissioning and polling; polled EVMs are escorted to reception centres with candidates allowed to follow; EVMs are stored in strong rooms with double lock, 24×7 CCTV, and armed security under candidate watch; and opening/closing is always done in presence of candidates under videography.

Factually incorrect. Before actual poll, a mock poll with at least 50 votes is conducted at every polling station in presence of polling agents. After mock poll, results are cleared from EVM and VVPAT, and it is shown that EVM has no vote and VVPAT has no slip before sealing. Moreover, when the RESULT BUTTON is pressed, the CU also displays Poll Start Time and Poll End Time, so any pre-poll vote can be identified.

Yes. Each BU, CU, and VVPAT has a unique Serial Number (ID) engraved on its cabinet. The list of unique IDs allocated to each polling station is provided to contesting candidates and can be tallied anytime during polling/counting. The CU also displays its own unique ID on its display panel, and the VVPAT ID is printed on each VVPAT slip.

No. Candidate names appear in alphabetical order (first National/State Recognised parties, then registered parties, then independents), which changes every election. EVMs go through two levels of randomisation — first at DEO level for AC-wise allocation (in presence of political parties), then at RO level for polling station-wise allocation (in presence of candidates). This double randomisation makes it impossible to determine in advance which machine goes where.

FLC is the process of checking EVMs before use in elections — only FLC-passed units are used. It is called “First Level” because it is the first check done well before election announcement, by authorised engineers, under DEO supervision, in presence of political party representatives. The check ensures only functional EVMs/VVPATs (able to withstand various environmental conditions) are available for the upcoming election.

FLC is conducted by authorised engineers of BEL and ECIL under control of the District Election Officer and direct supervision of the Dy. DEO, in the presence of representatives of recognised Political Parties.

FLC involves: (1) Cleaning of machines; (2) Visual inspection of BU, CU, VVPAT, cables, connectors; (3) Internal inspection of BU/CU/VVPAT PCBs for spurious components; (4) Functionality checks using Pre-FLC Unit (P-FLCU); (5) Symbol loading in VVPAT using SLU with live TV display for political parties; (6) Casting of 96 votes (6 per candidate button × 16) and verification; (7) FLC sticker labelling (Green for pass, Red with reason for rejection); (8) Mock Poll in 5% of randomly selected EVMs (1200 votes in 1%, 1000 in 2%, 500 in 2%).

FLC is conducted before every election. For State Legislative Assembly elections, generally at least 4 months before election. For Lok Sabha elections, at least 6 months before. For bye-elections, generally within 1 month of the vacancy occurring.

Every vote is verified by the voter. The existing statute (Rule 49 MA) already provides for the voter to report any discrepancy between the BU choice and the VVPAT slip. Given this existing provision, such a modified system would be superfluous. Voters who find a discrepancy may immediately report it to the Presiding Officer, who can take action as prescribed.

No. There is no prescribed cut-off or range for this. The Commission only prescribes minimum availability after FLC: 120% BU, 120% CU, and 130% VVPAT compared to the number of polling stations, to ensure no shortage on poll day.

Yes. ECI-EVM design is periodically updated — the current M3 model uses public key encryption and digital certificates for mutual authentication. Salient features of ECI-EVMs are available in public domain publications (Presentation on EVM, Manual on EVM, Status Paper on EVM, Legal History of EVM). Laws and Rules allow voter/candidate complaints and legal recourse. ECI also holds open debates on EVMs periodically.

No. Once a button is pressed, the vote is recorded and a loud beep confirms completion. The EVM does not respond to any further button pressing. The next vote is enabled only when the Presiding Officer presses the Ballot Button for the next verified voter. This eliminates ballot box stuffing, which was a major issue in the paper ballot system.

No. ECI-EVMs use secure controllers with One Time Programming (OTP) — reprogramming is permanently disabled after initial programming. EVMs are standalone devices with no wired or wireless connectivity. BU, CU, and VVPAT use digital certificates for mutual authentication, so no look-alike machine can be connected. All these claims are baseless, and EVMs undergo electromagnetic testing to verify zero Wi-Fi/Bluetooth capability. Mock Polls at multiple stages with VVPAT verification further confirm correct functioning.

Yes. In case of election dispute, reconstruction of the vote for authentication is possible from data stored in the CU. This has been demonstrated in courts whenever required in cases of election disputes.

BEL and ECIL use standard off-the-shelf microcontrollers, so all technical information is available publicly via manufacturers’ datasheets. The OTP feature is activated not by hardware pins, but by a software command that, on first power-on run, sets an internal register to permanently shut off re-programmability. Once done, the programme cannot be changed under any circumstances. This process is documented in public domain datasheets.

If a DRE produces a voter verifiable paper audit trail, it is software independent — and ECI-EVM already produces such a paper audit trail (VVPAT). The voter verifies the printed slip, and the correlation between CU count and VVPAT slip count is established statistically with high confidence as mandated by the Supreme Court. ECI-EVM design is evaluated at formulation, prototype, and pilot stages against worst-case considerations.

ECI-EVMs are simple, stand-alone, and robust. They use advanced cryptographic methods and cannot be connected to any external device. To build trust, testing/checking/observation and Mock Poll protocols are introduced across all stages of EVM deployment. VVPAT allows instant voter verification. All EVM handling processes occur in full view and participation of stakeholders.

The Symbol Loading Unit (SLU) is part of the overall EVM infrastructure, used only during commissioning to load candidate data. During actual voting, the CU, BU, and VVPAT together remain a standalone device with no external connectivity. The SLU is an authorised EVM-specific device and is not used during polling.

VVPAT has two types of memory: (1) One Time Programmed (OTP) memory for firmware/program instructions — this cannot be changed after factory programming; (2) Data memory for graphical images of candidate serial numbers, names, and symbols — loaded using the Symbol Loading Unit during commissioning before each election, with live display for candidates/their representatives. During actual voting, no external access to VVPAT is possible.

No. Microcontrollers are loaded with firmware by BEL/ECIL inside their own factories using a 4-layered Secure Manufacturing Facility (SMF). The loading occurs in the L3 area accessible only to designated engineers with access cards and biometric scans. No external agency — domestic or foreign — is involved in firmware loading.

ECI-EVMs are absolutely standalone with no wired or wireless connectivity — no external communication channel exists to influence the data. The firmware is OTP in Read-Only Memory and cannot be updated or modified. Administrative safeguards ensure no unauthorized access to EVMs at any stage. Technical and administrative safeguards together make EVMs impregnable.

Several reasons make this impossible: (1) BU, CU, and VVPAT are manufactured in a Secure Manufacturing Facility (SMF) with strict monitoring; (2) After program loading, the OTP permanently disables re-programming; (3) Each unit contains an Unauthorised Access Detection Module (UADM) that renders the machine unusable if anyone attempts to open it; (4) ECI-EVM is candidate-agnostic — the CU only recognises key numbers, not candidate names/symbols; (5) Two levels of randomisation make pre-allocation manipulation impossible; (6) List of candidates is finalised only days before polling.

Each BU has a thumbwheel switch set to its physical position (1, 2, 3, etc.) during commissioning. The CU uses a combination of the thumbwheel switch position and the key number pressed to determine the unique candidate number. For example, key 7 from BU1 = candidate 7, key 7 from BU2 = candidate 23, key 7 from BU3 = candidate 39. If any BU is connected in the wrong position, the CU displays an error message.

The tinted glass maintains the constitutional requirement of vote secrecy — the slip is not visible to anyone other than the voter unless the internal LED lights are on. Initial VVPAT samples had transparent glass, but the final model was approved by the Technical Expert Committee (January 2013) with tinted glass, as demonstrated to political parties on 10th May 2013. All bulk production has always used tinted glass.

In M3 EVMs, the CU is always Master; BU and VVPAT are Slave units. BU and VVPAT do not communicate with each other — only through CU. When a voter presses a button on BU, BU sends the button number to CU, which commands VVPAT to print the corresponding slip. Only after the slip is printed, cut, and the VVPAT sends an acknowledgement does the CU register the vote and emit a BEEP. Votes are recorded only in CU, not in BU or VVPAT.

BU rejection criteria: damaged cable, connectors, switches, toggle, buttons, thumbwheel, LED, etc. CU rejection criteria: damaged connectors, switches, LED, buzzer problems, display issues, clock error, not responding, etc. VVPAT rejection criteria: paper lock problems, damaged connectors/cable, mechanical errors, sensor errors (length, contrast, deplete, fall). Important: non-functional does not mean erroneous results — it only means the unit has stopped functioning.

VVPAT has four optoelectrical sensors (Deplete, Contrast, Fall, Length). “Field limit” is the range of acceptable electrical values for each sensor in the field. “Factory limit” is a tighter range — for example, if field limit for a sensor is 100–150, the factory limit might be 110–140. VVPATs that don’t meet factory limits are not cleared from the factory, ensuring minimal sensor failures in the field.

No. The EVM does not have an Operating System. It only has firmware/machine-level instructions sealed/embedded in a One Time Programmed (OTP) memory, which eliminates any scope of re-programmability.

EVMs have firmware, not software. Firmware is microcode embedded into hardware to help it operate — it is small (few kilobytes), rarely changed, and typically inaccessible. In EVMs, firmware is in OTP memory and is never changed. Software, by contrast, is installed on devices for user interaction (browsing, applications, etc.), runs on operating systems, is much larger (hundreds of KB to GB), and is regularly updated. EVMs being firmware-based means they cannot be updated or reprogrammed like software.

EVM designs are independently reviewed and audited by the Technical Expert Committee (TEC). Third-party (STQC) checks are conducted. Various design details are publicly available. Political parties/candidates/their representatives conduct independent audits through Mock Polls at multiple stages. Election outcomes themselves — showing regular changes in governments — are the biggest real-world validation of EVM integrity.

Under Rule 56D of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961, contesting candidates may request VVPAT slip counting after EVM counting is complete. Under Rule 56D(4)(b), if there is a discrepancy between the CU electronic count and VVPAT slip count, the VVPAT slip count shall prevail. Additionally, an Election Petition may be filed before the competent High Court, where the court may order counting of each and every VVPAT slip.

VVPAT was introduced for greater transparency and voter confidence through immediate vote verification. Normally, counting is done from the CU (per Rule 56C). However, if there is a discrepancy, Rule 56D(4)(b) clearly states the VVPAT slip count shall prevail. Candidates may request VVPAT counting under Rule 56D, and courts may order full VVPAT counting through Election Petitions. Both CU and VVPAT together ensure the integrity of the process.

Mandatory verification of five randomly selected polling stations per AC/segment is a strong post-poll audit done in presence of all stakeholders. Till date, slips of 38,156 randomly selected VVPATs have been counted — not a single case of vote transfer from candidate A to candidate B has been found. Candidates may also request VVPAT counting under Rule 56D, and courts may order full counting through Election Petitions.

EVMs are used as mandated by the Representation of People Act, 1951 — a statutory mandate from Parliament, upheld by the judiciary. Multiple courts including the Supreme Court have dismissed petitions to stop EVM use. In a 2021 judgment (C.R. Jaya Sukin vs ECI), the Delhi High Court even imposed costs on the petitioner while dismissing the plea. ECI constantly works to increase transparency and stakeholder participation.

VVPAT was introduced per the Supreme Court pronouncement in Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs ECI (2013). Key legal provisions: Rule 49A allows attachment of a VVPAT printer to EVMs; Rule 49M requires that when VVPAT is used, voters can view the printed slip showing serial number, name, and symbol of their chosen candidate through the transparent window before it is cut and dropped into the sealed drop box.

Yes. Under Rule 49MA, if a voter alleges the VVPAT slip shows a different candidate, the PO obtains a written declaration from the voter (after informing them of consequences of false declaration under IPC). The voter is then permitted to cast a test vote in presence of candidates/polling agents and observe the slip. If the allegation is proven true, polling is stopped and the RO is informed. If the allegation is false and the test vote slip matches, remarks are made in Form 17A and the voter signs them.

Yes. Transparency is ensured through open conduct of all EVM processes — storage, transport, randomisation, FLC, commissioning, voting, and counting — in full view of stakeholders. Freedom is ensured through elaborate security at election booths preventing inducement, fear, or coercion. Fairness is ensured through the EVM’s technical design, double randomisation, thorough FLC and Mock Polls, and VVPAT verification. Together, these ensure transparent, free, and fair elections.

ECI is itself an independent Constitutional authority. EVM technical review is done by TEC. Third-party (STQC) checks are conducted. VVPAT printed slips are verified by voters, and CU-VVPAT correlations are statistically established with high confidence. Political parties/candidates conduct independent audits through Mock Polls. All EVM processes and findings are publicly available on the ECI website.

Yes, numerous Election Petitions have been filed over the decades. Multiple courts including the Supreme Court of India have consistently reposed faith in Indian EVMs. A comprehensive study is available in the booklet “Legal History of EVMs,” which provides insight into the statutory framework, milestones, and all judicial decisions on EVM and VVPAT.

Yes. Statistical accuracy of sampling depends on the absolute sample size, not the percentage of the population. The committee used a 99.993665752% confidence level (4-sigma) with a 2% margin of error. However, the Supreme Court’s mandate to verify 5 VVPATs per AC/segment goes far beyond this — for parliamentary elections, this means testing 20,625 randomly chosen VVPATs, providing near certainty that election integrity is maintained.

This is incorrect — Direct Recording Machines are used in several countries including the USA (27 states, with paper trails in 15), Australia, Canada, Argentina, Brazil, Namibia, and Bhutan. The choice of voting method depends on each country’s legal framework and electoral history. Indian EVMs have legislative approval (Parliament amended the law in December 1988) and have been upheld by the Supreme Court. India’s adoption of EVMs early in its electoral history is considered a progressive and forward-looking reform.

EVMs have been used since 1982 (universally since 2000) with all permutations of electoral outcomes — favouring and disfavouring all parties across the political spectrum. This would not be possible if tampering were remotely feasible. Strong technical safeguards (SMF, OTP, UADM, digital certificates) combined with stringent administrative procedures and mandatory stakeholder participation at every stage ensure integrity. The system-based safety protocols, not individual trust, form the foundation of ECI-EVM security.

ECI-EVM is thoroughly verifiable: voters verify via VVPAT slips, and CU count is strongly correlated with VVPAT slip count per Supreme Court-mandated sampling. EVM design is evaluated for worst-case scenarios. All stakeholders are involved at every stage of EVM storage, movement, FLC, commissioning, mock polls, polling, and counting. The EVM is a closed system with no communication with external entities during operation.

(i) The voter verifies their vote via VVPAT slip (name, serial number, symbol of chosen candidate) — proving vote was cast as intended. (ii) CU count is strongly correlated with VVPAT slip count over a large sample (Supreme Court-mandated). (iii) Over successive elections, 41,629 randomly selected VVPATs (2.3 crore votes) have been tallied — not a single case of vote transfer from candidate A to candidate B has been found. Regular changes in governments further prove EVM integrity.

This statement is factually incorrect. Only the EVM total count and Form-17C total should match. Form-17A lists voters who came to the polling station, while Form-17C records voters who actually voted — these may differ (some voters may decide not to vote, or be turned away). Any difference is reported in Part-I of Form 17-C. The EVM count is verified against Form-17C on counting day in the presence of candidates/counting agents. Discrepancies in EVM-17C counts (if any, due to human error) are handled per established protocol.

EVM transport protocols: (i) EVMs are transported only in vehicles provided by DEOs/ROs along pre-defined routes; (ii) EVM vehicles can be escorted by authorised candidate representatives after polling; (iii) Any violation of ECI protocols results in strict disciplinary action and criminal charges against concerned officers.

EVMs are never kept in private premises — they are always in double-locked, CCTV-covered, armed-security warehouses/strong rooms. All past instances of EVMs reportedly found in hotels or private premises were investigated and found to involve reserve EVMs due to human mistakes. Reserve EVMs are provided to Sector Officers with security and GPS/app-tracked vehicles. Any violation of instructions results in disciplinary action. The factual details were shared with candidates/media to clear doubts.

In Lok Sabha 2019 FLC: 1.8% BUs, 3.8% CUs, and 5.4% VVPATs were rejected. However, actual poll replacement rates were much lower: BU-0.74%, CU-0.79%, VVPAT-3.36%. Post-election, TEC conducted an exhaustive analysis with BEL and ECIL. Corrective actions were identified for M3 VVPATs. M2 machines were discontinued as their 15-year life was complete. M2-M3 VVPATs were upgraded to full M3 standard for compatibility.

Such reports are misleading. Non-functional VVPAT means only stoppage of functioning — not erroneous/biased functioning. The actual number sent for preventive maintenance was 3.43 lakh (per ECI circular dated 27 January 2022), not 6.5 lakh. The figure of 6.5 lakh arose from wrongly totalling overlapping task categories (T1, T2, T3 tasks) rather than understanding that one machine may need multiple corrective actions. HALT testing was introduced as a standard manufacturing practice to prevent future issues.

ECI-EVM design ensures no vote can be cast after the CLOSE button is pressed. After poll, machines are sealed with candidate/agent signatures. Candidates and agents can escort machines and watch strong rooms until counting. Poll start and end times are displayed on CU at every switch-on and recorded in the PO’s diary. Form-17C records total votes polled — any injection/deletion after polling would contradict these multiple independent records.

Yes, these were reserve EVMs. Information about all EVMs is shared with political parties and candidates at each stage of election preparation — this was done in 2019 as well. All such allegations were false and factually incorrect. ECI issued Press Note No. ECI/PN/56/2019 on 21st May 2019 clarifying this, which remains available on the ECI website.

None of those videos use ECI-EVMs or follow ECI-prescribed procedures. ECI-EVMs cannot be tampered with because: they are manufactured in Secure Manufacturing Facilities; firmware is OTP and permanently locked; each unit has an UADM that renders the machine unusable if anyone attempts to open it; EVMs are standalone with no external connectivity; and all processes are conducted in full view of stakeholders. Any attempt to modify after production will automatically fail.

No. The original firmware is loaded at the factory many months before deployment — well before candidate names and serial numbers are known. After loading, the OTP permanently disables any re-programming. Multiple Mock Polls are conducted at FLC, commissioning, and poll day with VVPAT verification to detect any anomaly. The EVM has no OS and no external connectivity. Till date, 41,629 randomly selected VVPATs have been tallied with zero cases of vote transfer.

This is a baseless, unscientific claim. ECI-EVM microcontrollers are OTP — once programmed, re-programmability is permanently shut off. The microcontrollers used by BEL/ECIL have no internal Bluetooth or Wi-Fi modules — this can be verified from their publicly available datasheets. EVMs undergo electromagnetic testing to verify no Wi-Fi or Bluetooth capability. BU, CU, and VVPAT use digital certificates for mutual authentication — no lookalike machine can connect. Only authorised BEL/ECIL engineers handle FLC and symbol loading, in presence of all stakeholders.

ECI-EVMs cannot be compared to computers running operating systems. EVMs run on specific OTP firmware designed solely to faithfully record voters’ choices — a fundamentally simpler and more secure architecture. The EVM has been proven truthful over decades through changes in multiple state and central governments. EVMs eliminated booth capturing, invalid votes, and made elections safer. VVPAT allows instant voter verification and CU-VVPAT count matching per established statistical principles provides very high confidence in results.

ECI agrees — EVM security design starts with the assumption that tampering attempts will be made. Based on this, strong security features are incorporated: mutual authentication prevents connection with external devices; strict quality checks ensure no Wi-Fi/Bluetooth connectivity; UADM renders the EVM unusable upon any tampering attempt; administrative safeguards, stakeholder participation, and media scrutiny provide additional layers; rigorous testing and three stages of Mock Polls are conducted before deployment; double randomisation is applied; and ECI regularly maintains EVMs/VVPATs and weeds out likely failures.

ECI-EVM designers are aware of electromagnetic interference risks. Accordingly, CU, BU, and VVPAT are subjected to RF fields from 10 kHz to 6 GHz during functional testing as per IEC standards. RF emissions from EVM units are monitored to ensure no significant RF is emitted (which could provide an external communication channel). These measures confirm EVMs are a closed system with no communication with the external world during operation.

No candidate or their agent complained of any discrepancy between total votes polled in EVM and results obtained. Voter turnout is a dynamic figure — the final turnout is formalised by the Returning Officer only after scrutiny of all related documents, and is then shared with all contesting candidates.

The matter is sub-judice and necessary clarifications have been provided to the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay. This issue is nothing more than a twisting, selective, and wrongful representation of facts by vested interests.

The German court’s observations were in the context of German law and German EVMs. Indian EVMs are fundamentally different: manufactured by Indian PSUs in secure facilities, subjected to rigorous third-party testing (STQC) before deployment, and governed by elaborate protocols for movement, storage, and use. Indian EVMs have been examined repeatedly by the Supreme Court and various High Courts, all of which have consistently reposed confidence in them. The German and Indian systems and legal frameworks are non-comparable.

No. The CU display is housed within the Unauthorised Access Detect Module (UADM). Any attempt to even open the UADM disables the entire EVM. Additionally, the EVM has no radio frequency transmission or reception capability, making it impossible to receive any signal to alter the display. Therefore, replacing the display module or using a Bluetooth-based display device to show false results is completely impossible by design.